- ©1996–2014,QNXSoftwareSystemsLimited,asubsidiaryofBlackBerry.All rightsreserved. QNXSoftwareSystemsLimited 1001FarrarRoad Ottawa,Ontario K2K0B3 Canada.
- Someone knows how can I install and use SSH at QNX Neutrino 6.3.2? Thanks in advance! Jucaross Active Member Posts: 39 Joined: 04 Nov, 2010 - 18:37. RE: Installing SSH on QNX Neutrino 6.3.2. By jucaross » 07 Feb, 2011 - 17:06. And also need the version of the ssh that I must install.
Issued by:
The QNX Neutrino RTOS is designed for applications requiring nonstop, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year operation. It implements POSIX-compliant users, groups, permissions, usermasks, processes, threads, and priorities:. Users: On QNX Neutrino and other Unix. QNX Neutrino 6.3.x - x86, PowerPC, MIPS, ARM, SH-4 by pjtanz on 09:28 PM - edited on 03:29 AM by: pjtanz QNX Software Systems is the.
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Certification Body
Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme
Certification Body
Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme
© Government of Canada, Communications Security Establishment Canada, 2009
Evaluation Number | 383-4-95-CR |
---|---|
Version | 1.0 |
Date | 25 March 2009 |
Table of Contents
- 7 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
- 12 ITS Product Testing
Disclaimer
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility – established under the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) – using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3, for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3.. This certification report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the CCS, and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by the Communications Security Establishment Canada, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the Communications Security Establishment Canada, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Foreword
The Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Evaluation Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the CCS Certification Body, which is managed by the Communications Security Establishment Canada.
A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the CCS Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025:2005, the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories. Accreditation is performed under the Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories - Canada (PALCAN), administered by the Standards Council of Canada.
The CCEF that carried out this evaluation is EWA-Canada located in Ottawa, Ontario.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the CCS Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the product satisfies the security requirements.
This certification report is associated with the certificate of product evaluation dated 25 March 2009, and the security target identified in Section 4 of this report.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted on the CCS Certified Products list and Common Criteria Portal.
This certification report makes reference to the following trademarked names:
- QNX® and QNX Neutrino® are registered trademarks of QNX® Software Systems.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
Executive Summary
The QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel from QNX Software Systems, is the Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 4 augmented evaluation.
The QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel v6.4.0 provides the microkernel for the QNX Neutrino® Realtime Operating System. QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel v6.4.0 provides a memory protected microkernel architecture for reliable, scalable and realtime performance in embedded applications. The QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel v6.4.0 operates as a self-contained, protected microkernel within the QNX Neutrino® RTOS. This allows the secure kernel to be used as a core system building block in a wide variety of operating system technologies.
In addition to its POSIX-compliant features, the QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel v6.4.0 implements an optional scheduling algorithm. The scheduling algorithm allows partitions to be created with a defined budget (percentage) of CPU cycles. Processes and threads are assigned to partitions and under conditions of heavy CPU load each partition is guaranteed to receive its assigned share of CPU cycles regardless of the priority of the processes/threads assigned to the partition. The scheduler is adaptive in that under normal load conditions unused CPU cycles from one partition are allocated to other partitions running processes/threads of higher priority.
EWA-Canada is the Common Criteria Evaluation Facility that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 13 March 2009 and was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS).
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)Footnote 1 for this product provide sufficient evidence that it meets the EAL 4 Augmented assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality. The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 (with applicable final interpretations), for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version 2.3. The following augmentation is claimed: ALC_FLR.1 – Basic flaw remediation;
Communications Security Establishment Canada, as the CCS Certification Body, declares that the QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the CCS Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the Common Criteria Project).
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 4 augmented evaluation is the QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel, from QNX Software Systems.
2 TOE Description
The QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel v6.4.0 provides the microkernel for the QNX Neutrino® Realtime Operating System. QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel v6.4.0 provides a memory protected microkernel architecture for reliable, scalable and realtime performance in embedded applications. The QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel v6.4.0 operates as a self-contained, protected microkernel within the QNX Neutrino® RTOS. This allows the secure kernel to be used as a core system building block in a wide variety of operating system technologies.
In addition to its POSIX-compliant features, the QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel v6.4.0 implements an optional scheduling algorithm. The scheduling algorithm allows partitions to be created with a defined budget (percentage) of CPU cycles. Processes and threads are assigned to partitions and under conditions of heavy CPU load each partition is guaranteed to receive its assigned share of CPU cycles regardless of the priority of the processes/threads assigned to the partition. The scheduler is adaptive in that under normal load conditions unused CPU cycles from one partition are allocated to other partitions running processes/threads of higher priority.
3 Evaluated Security Functionality
The complete list of evaluated security functionality for the QNX Neutrino Secure Kernel is identified in Section 5 of the Security Target (ST).
4 Security Target
The ST associated with this Certification Report is identified by the following nomenclature:
- Title: QNX® Software Systems, QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel v6.4 Security Target
- Version: Document Version 1.1
- Date: 15 December 2009
5 Common Criteria Conformance
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3.
The QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel is:
- Common Criteria Part 2 conformant, with security functional requirements based only upon functional components in Part 2;
- Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, with security assurance requirements based only upon assurance components in Part 3; and
- Common Criteria EAL 4 Augmented, with all the security assurance requirements in the EAL 4 package, as well as the following: ALC_FLR.1.
6 Security Policy
The QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel implements an Access Control Security Functional Policy which governs the assignment of CPU resources (cycles) to executing threads based both on the priority assigned to the thread and the adaptive partition to which the thread is assigned.
The QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel also implements an Information Flow Control Security Functional Policy which governs the creation and subsequent access to shared memory resources based upon both the permissions of the creating/accessing thread and the permissions assigned to the shared memory area at creation.
Details of the Access Control and Information Flow Control security policies can be found in Section 5 of the ST.
In addition to the named security policies listed above, QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel also implements policies pertaining to process/thread identification, security management, residual information protection and protection of the TOE, including fault tolerance, priority of service and CPU usage quotas. Further details on these security policies are found in Section 5 of the ST.
7 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
![Qnx neutrino rtos Qnx neutrino rtos](https://img1.labirint.ru/books43/425603/big.jpg)
Consumers of the QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel product should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the product's installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel.
7.1 Secure Usage Assumptions
The following Secure Usage Assumptions are listed in the ST:
- Competent, trusted and trained administrative staff are assigned to install, configure and operate the QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel; and
- Staff assigned to write processes and threads for execution by the TOE are non-hostile, appropriately trained and adhere to all appropriate guidance.
7.2 Environmental Assumptions
The following Environmental Assumption is listed in the ST:
- Physical security measures commensurate with the value of assets protected by the TOE exist for the environment in which the TOE is hosted
7.3 Clarification of Scope
Users of QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel should note that QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel includes only the QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel which consists of the procnto system process and its associated C library. As such the TOE does not constitute a complete product intended for consumer use, but rather consists of a secure kernel which product developers may use in order to create a wide variety of commercial products. Users of QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel are therefore cautioned that the ultimate security of commercial products based upon the TOE may be highly dependent upon the additional features added to the TOE in order to create an end user product. In particular, users of QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel should note that it does not include any audit capabilities, nor does it include any drivers, files systems or networking capabilities.
8 Architectural Information
The TOE consists solely of the compiled QNX Neutrino Realtime Operating System microkernel which encompasses the Procnto Subsystem (compiled and executed as the procnto system process) and the C Library Subsystem (the compiled lib/c C-Language library). The lib/c subsystem provides the external interface to which other external applications (including other OS components and user applications) can link.
9 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration of the TOE consists of the QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel v6.4.0 running on the following processor families:
- ARM9;
- ARM11; and
- x86 Multicore.
As described in the previous section, the TOE boundary encompasses only the procnto system process and the compiled lib/c C-language library. All other components fall outside the TOE boundary in the IT environment. These include all hardware items such as CPU boards, power supplies and video displays. The IT environment also includes all of the software components required to create a functional operating system including device drivers, files systems, networking and user applications. The TOE was tested by compiling the QNX Neutrino® Realtime Operating System v6.4.0 with the QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel v6.4.0 and the optional adaptive partitioning scheduler as described in the QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel 6.4.0 Release Notes Section 10.e.
10 Documentation
The QSS documents provided to the consumer are as follows:
- QNX Neutrino® RTOS: Getting Started with QNX Neutrino®, A Guide for Realtime Programmers by Rob Krten;
- QNX Neutrino® RTOS User's Guide, for release 6.4 or later;
- QNX Neutrino® RTOS System Architecture, for release 6.4.0;
- QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel 6.4.0, Release Notes;
- QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel 6.4.0, Installation Note;
- QNX Neutrino® RTOS Adaptive Partitioning User's Guide, for QNX Neutrino® 6.4.0; and
- QNX Neutrino® Realtime Operating System Utilities Reference, for QNX Neutrino® 6.4.0.
In addition the QSS web site (www.qnx.com) provides access to a wide range of additional product documentation, including white papers and source code.
11 Evaluation Analysis Activities
Gds software for kia. The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel, including the following areas:
Configuration management: An analysis of the QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel configuration items were clearly marked, and could be modified and controlled. The developer's configuration management system was observed during a site visit, and it was found to be mature and well developed.
Secure delivery and operation: The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of the procedures required to maintain the integrity of the QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel during distribution to the consumer. The evaluators examined and tested the installation, generation and start-up procedures, and determined that they were complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.
Design documentation: The evaluators analysed the QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel functional specification, high-level design, low-level design, and a subset of the implementation representation. The evaluators determined that the documents were internally consistent, and completely and accurately instantiated all interfaces and security functions. The evaluators also independently verified that the correspondence mappings between the design documents were correct.
Guidance documents: The evaluators examined the QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel user and administrator guidance documentation and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously described how to securely use and administer the product, and that it was consistent with the other documents supplied for evaluation.
Life-cycle support: The evaluators examined the development security procedures during a site visit and determined that they detailed sufficient security measures for the development environment to protect the confidentiality and integrity of QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel design and implementation. The evaluators determined that the developer has used a documented model of the TOE life-cycle and well-defined development tools that yield consistent and predictable results. The evaluators reviewed the flaw remediation procedures used by QSS for the QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel. During a site visit, the evaluators also examined the evidence generated by adherence to the procedures. The evaluators concluded that the procedures are adequate to track and correct security flaws, and distribute the flaw information and corrections to consumers of the product.
Vulnerability assessment: The evaluators examined the developer's vulnerability analysis for the QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel and found that it sufficiently described each of the potential vulnerabilities along with a sound rationale as to why it was not exploitable in the intended environment. Additionally, the evaluators conducted an independent review of public domain vulnerability databases, and all evaluation deliverables to provide assurance that the developer has considered all potential vulnerabilities.
All these evaluation activities resulted in PASS verdicts.
12 ITS Product Testing
Testing at EAL 4 consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent functional tests, and performing penetration tests.
12.1 Assessment of Developer Tests
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the ETRFootnote 2.
QNX Software Systems employs a rigorous testing process for the QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel. The automated testing process includes functional testing based upon product requirement documents as well as feature specific testing derived from the problem reporting system. Comprehensive regression testing is conducted for each candidate build of the product.
The evaluators analyzed the developer's test coverage and depth analysis and found them to be complete and accurate. The developer's test documentation demonstrated complete correspondence between the tests identified in the developer's test documentation and both the functional specification and high level design.
12.2 Independent Functional Testing
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining design and guidance documentation, examining the developer's test documentation, executing a sample of the developer's test cases, and creating test cases that augmented the developer tests.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and results. Resulting from this test approach was the following list of EWA-Canada test goals:
- Initialization: The objective of this test goal is to follow the developer's procedures for installation and configuration of QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel in order to ensure that the tested version of QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel is identical to the evaluated configuration described in the Security Target.
- Repeat of Developer's Tests: The objective of this test goal is to repeat a subset of the developer's tests.
- Resource Utilization: The objective of this test goal is to confirm that QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel allocates CPU resources based on thread priority and that QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel is also able to guarantee a specific percentage of CPU resources to the thread or threads running within an adaptive partition.
- Protection of the TSF: The objective of this test goal is to confirm that the failure of a process or thread does not prevent the continued execution of other processes or threads.
12.3 Independent Penetration Testing
Subsequent to the examination of the developer's vulnerability analysis, independent vulnerability analysis, and the independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and all evaluation deliverables, limited independent evaluator penetration testing was conducted. The penetration tests focused on:
- Generic vulnerabilities;
- Bypassing;
- Tampering; and
- Direct attacks
As a result of this analysis, a number of independent vulnerability and penetration test cases were developed and executed. Given the limited scope of the TOE boundary, the penetration tests focused on the area of direct attacks as this appeared to be the most likely area for vulnerabilities to be found.
The evaluator did not uncover any vulnerabilities which were not described in the developer's vulnerability analysis. The evaluator found that QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel did not have any open ports. The evaluator also tested failure modes and was unable to place QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel into an insecure state via a failure. The evaluator executed a denial of service attack (large process volume) and was unable to induce either failure or service degradation in QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel.
The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the anticipated operating environment of QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel.
12.4 Conduct of Testing
The QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel was subjected to a suite of documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The testing took place both at the Information Technology Security Evaluation and Test (ITSET) Facility at EWA-Canada and at the testing facilities of QNX® Software Systems. The CCS Certification Body witnessed a portion of the independent testing. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are documented in a separate Test Results document. How to search for a printer on mac.
12.5 Testing Results
The developer's tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results, giving assurance that the QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.
13 Results of the Evaluation
This evaluation has provided the basis for an EAL 4+ level of assurance. The overall verdict for the evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
14 Evaluator Comments, Observations and Recommendations
QNX® Software Systems employs a full time Quality Manager and has implemented a comprehensive Quality System which permeates every aspect of the company from product conceptualization through development and extending into marketing, sales and support. The wide range of quality, safety, security and industrial certifications achieved by the company are clear evidence of the corporate commitment to the quality system.
QNX® Software Systems has also adopted a highly proactive approach to security within their products. The company has designated an individual within the development team to monitor the public security forums and act as the focal point for security issues related to QNX® Software Systems products. The company has a very active user community who are well supported by the company and are actively encouraged to provide security feedback to the development team. The evaluators were able to observe this process in operation during the evaluation as a user discovered security flaw was reported, recorded, tracked and corrected during the course of the evaluation.
The evaluators found the QNX® Software Systems documentation for the TOE to be of exceptional quality. The installation guidance was clear and precise. The user guidance was equally clear and included very frank and realistic sections describing security issues and decisions that users must make in order to implement a secure system using the TOE.
15 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations
- CCEF
- Common Criteria Evaluation Facility
- CCS
- Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme
- CPL
- Certified Products list
- CPU
- Central Processing Unit
- EAL
- Evaluation Assurance Level
- ETR
- Evaluation Technical Report
- ISO
- International Standards Organization
- IT
- Information Technology
- ITSET
- Information Technology Security Evaluation and Testing
- OS
- Operating System
- PALCAN
- Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories Canada
- POSIX
- Portable Operating System Interface for UNIX
- QA
- Quality Assurance
- RTOS
- Real Time Operating System
- SFP
- Security Function Policy
- ST
- Security Target
- TOE
- Target of Evaluation
- TSF
- TOE Security Functionality
16 References
This section lists all documentation used as source material for this report:
- Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) CCS-Guide-004, Version 1.1, Technical Oversight for TOE Evaluation.
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3, August 2005.
- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 2.3, August 2005.
- QNX® Software Systems, QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel v6.4 Security Target, Document Version 1.1, 15 December 2009.
- Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) QNX Neutrino® Secure Kernel, EAL 4+ Evaluation, Common Criteria Evaluation Number: 383-4-95, Document No. 1576-000-D002, Version 1.4, 13 March 2009.
Notes
Footnotes
The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
533 words [ 31 Screenshots ] [ 21 Versions ] [ 3 Weblinks ] - Last update: 2020-08-03 Page created: 2004-04-03 [SB]
QNX
QNX is a real time operating system designed for critical tasks. Developed by QNX Software Systems it has a structure similar to UNIX and is compatible to POSIX. With an API Wrapper it supports software for Linux, the source code was opened by QNX partly. His strengths are the development of software, control of industrial roboters and embedded devices. By the real time ability of QNX the Neutrino Kernel allows with a pentium III the controlled reaction time (interrupt processing) of 0.55 µ sec in which events can be registered. For comparison purposes: Windows NT 4.0 and other time-sharing operating systems react to events only after approx. 10 ms. The GUI with the name photon was introduced for the first time in version QNX 4.x. Before the window manager was named 'QNX Windows' and 'X Windows'. Among other things the reaction behaviour of the GUI was improved.With the error tolerance, preemptive multitasking and the runtime memory protection it forms a stable base for many application purposes. Up till now the internet access with an ISDN card or a software modem is not supported yet. The simple user interface and low hardware requirements makes QNX interesting also for private use. For the private use QNX is free of charge usable and is ready for download on the QNX website. The also available QNX Moment Development Suite made it possible to develop applications for QNX.
QNX provided the Momentics Development Suite 2.2.0 with the operating system QNX Neutrino Kernel 6.3.0 for the evaluation on the website on June, 03. 2004. Till now, the new operating system can not downloaded separately. The use of the development software Momentics is restricted to a 30 day trial version. There also is a version for the installation of the Momentics IDE under Windows, Linux and Solaris. It contains a Clustering framework for the development of network based applications for transparent distributed processing. The software tools also were improved, Eclipse 2.1.2 and the GCC 3.3.1 are contained currently. QNX Neutrino supports now per default the representation of 3D pictures, multi-layer user interfaces and the view of the desktop on several monitors. The QNX Voyager Web browser supports SSL 3.0, HTML 4.01, XHTML 1.1, WAP 2.0, WML 1.3 and CSS now. This browser can scale and specify the website for small displays automatically. Now includet are the SCTP (stream control transmission Protocol), IP Filtering and NAT for networks.
The company QNX started to publish the source code of the QNX Neutrino Kernel over a Community portal of its own under a commercial licence in September 2007. Further components will follow that builds up on the QNX operating system. The release followed the source code for the implemented file systems FAT, EXT2, QNX4 and QNX6 as well as others in August 2008.
Field of application
- Embedded systems
- network area, internet client
- Development of applications with Photon Application Builder (PhAB)
- Engine control, Measuring data evaluation in real time
- Settop boxes
Structure information
Qnx Neutrino Rtos
- POSIX support- Neutrino microkernel
- Protected memory areas
- preemptive multitasking
- Photon microGUI
System environment
- x86 processors, SMP up to 8 CPUs
- fs-QNX file system as image file on a FAT or own partition
Qnx Neutrino Os
QNX Demo Disk, boot screen | QNX Demo Disk, demo license | QNX Demo Disk, Voyager web browser | QNX Demo Disk, context menu and animation |
QNX Demo Disk, file browser | 6.0 - QNX Neutrino, setup screen of QNX under Windows | 6.0 - After the installation the GUI lets itself be seen in remarkable colours and windows | 6.0 - The menus for starting the programs are similar to these of Windows and BeOS |
6.0 - The file manager shows the directory structure typical of a UNIX | 6.0 - File menu in the Photon text program | 6.0 - settings for a dial up internet connection | 6.2.1 - QNX, Desktop view with welcome message |
6.2.1 - Software installer for QNX software | 6.2.1 - Photon file manager, UNIX related file hierarchy | 6.2.1 - Dialling process for Internet access | 6.2.1 - Internet browser of QNX |
6.2.1 - command line with root-directory and version | 6.2.1 - The context menu for the configuration of the graphic device, network and others | 6.3.0 - QNX, boot menu | 6.3.0 - Setting of the graphics display |
6.3.0 - Login screen | 6.3.0 - program bar, Mozilla browser | 6.3.0 - Photon file manager and console | 6.3.0 - Quiet of the computer |
QNX 6.3.2, Boot menu before installation | QNX 6.3.2, Login screen | QNX 6.3.2, Standard desktop | QNX 6.3.2, Description |
QNX 6.3.2, Program menu | QNX 6.3.2, Momentics IDE 4.0.1 | QNX 6.3.2, Photon File browser and Shell |
Versions
1981 - QUNIX
1983 - QNX beta
1984 - QNX 1.0
1987 - QNX 2.0
1989 - QNX 2.21
1990 - QNX 4.0
1994 - QNX 4.1
1995 - QNX 4.2
1996 - QNX 4.22
1996 - QNX 4.24
1996 - QNX Neutrino 1.0 (RTP)
1997 - QNX 4.25
1998 - QNX Neutrino 2.0 (RTP)
1999 - QNX Neutrino 2.10 (RTP)
2001 Jan. - QNX RTP 6.0, first time for private customers free of charge
2001 July - QNX RTP 6.1.0, improved SCSI and multimedia support
2002 June - QNX 6.2
2003 Feb. - QNX RTP 6.2.1
2004 June - QNX Neutrino 6.3.0
2006 Sept. - QNX Neutrino 6.3.2
2008 Aug. - QNX Software Development Platform 6.4.0
1983 - QNX beta
1984 - QNX 1.0
1987 - QNX 2.0
1989 - QNX 2.21
1990 - QNX 4.0
1994 - QNX 4.1
1995 - QNX 4.2
1996 - QNX 4.22
1996 - QNX 4.24
1996 - QNX Neutrino 1.0 (RTP)
1997 - QNX 4.25
1998 - QNX Neutrino 2.0 (RTP)
1999 - QNX Neutrino 2.10 (RTP)
2001 Jan. - QNX RTP 6.0, first time for private customers free of charge
2001 July - QNX RTP 6.1.0, improved SCSI and multimedia support
2002 June - QNX 6.2
2003 Feb. - QNX RTP 6.2.1
2004 June - QNX Neutrino 6.3.0
2006 Sept. - QNX Neutrino 6.3.2
2008 Aug. - QNX Software Development Platform 6.4.0